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Introduction 
 
 Southeast Asia consists of eleven countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. As of 2018, the 
region’s GDP was $2.95 trillion and has been described as one of the fastest growing economic 
regions in the world. 1  Home to about 664 million people, Southeast Asia is the third most 
populated area in the world, and combined with its myriad of cultural groups and steady growth, 
this region and its regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has warranted study from a variety of perspectives.2 This organization includes all of the above 
states, except Timor-Leste, and has one characteristic that has been of particular interest to scholars. 
This is the ASEAN Way, a somewhat unique approach to diplomacy employed within the 
organization.3 In this thesis, I examine the ASEAN Way before hypothesizing how it contributes 
to the organization’s goal of establishing and maintaining regional peace and stability. This is done 
in an effort to answer the question ‘how has utilization of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN politics 
affected regional peace and stability?’ 
 Peace and stability are key components of ASEAN, and rightfully so. Tourism, agriculture, 
and foreign investment are major contributors to the region’s economic growth and should the 
region collapse into turmoil, it could result in global economic downturn. As one of the main 
reasons behind the founding of this organization, regional peace and stability is also one of the 
original seven initiatives of ASEAN and as such, has always been an important topic of discussion. 
To understand how the dialogue around peace and stability has developed over the course of this 
organization’s history, I examine two instances of turmoil in the region, one from 1988 and one 
from 2012, both within Myanmar. As the main approach for discussing issues in the region, 
understanding the ASEAN Way is key in examining the dialogue that surrounds peace and stability. 
It places emphasis on noninterference and consensus-based decision making, which some scholars 
argue is ineffective when dealing with conflict. Others, however, argue that this approach to 
diplomacy is more effective within the organization due to values shared by the member states. I 
 
1 H. Plecher, “ASEAN Countries GDP 2018,” Statista, December 6, 2019, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/796245/gdp-of-the-asean-countries/. 
2 “Population of South-Eastern Asia (LIVE),” Worldometer, accessed April 22, 2020, 
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-eastern-asia-population/. 
3 “Overview of Business in Southeast Asia,” ASEAN UP, accessed January 20, 2020, https://aseanup.com/business-
southeast-asia/. 
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have refrained from classifying the ASEAN Way as effective or not until after the analysis of both 
the ASEAN Way and the region’s history of peace and stability. 
 To begin, two key ideas must be defined for this thesis: what constitutes a disruption to 
regional peace and stability, and what is the ASEAN Way? Understanding what constitutes peace 
and stability is of the utmost importance, as scholars and policymakers define it in a variety of 
ways: outright war and conflict, economic collapse, ecological disaster, human rights violations, 
etc. To best answer this question, several documents must be consulted. The first is the ASEAN 
Declaration. This defines ASEAN’s initiatives and goals, the second of which is: “To promote 
regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the 
relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.”4 Furthermore, there is a brief section that highlights their belief in Southeast Asian states’ 
responsibility in: 
"…strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and 
ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that [Southeast 
Asian states] are determined to ensure stability and security from external 
interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national 
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples."5 
There are also the goals outlined by the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia (TAC) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). The TAC was 
ratified in 1976 and in addition to its own guidelines, also mentions the Ten Principles adopted by 
the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, among other things. The TAC emphasizes the 
importance of cooperation and promotes the idea of perpetual peace, before outlining its guiding 
principles: 
1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all nations. 
 
4 “Overview,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed January 20, 2020, https://asean.org/asean/about-
asean/overview; “Charter of the United Nations - Chapter I: Purposes and Principles,” United Nations, December 6, 
2018, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html; The principles outlined include sovereign 
equality, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and refrainment from threat or use of force to impede the 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. 
5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967” 
(1967), https://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/. 
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2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coersion. 
3. Noninterference in the internal affairs of one another. 
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means. 
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force. 
6. Effective cooperation among themselves.6 
It also discusses the importance of preventing disputes, settlement through friendly 
negotiations, and monitoring potential disturbances. Furthermore, the TAC notes that members 
may resort to other measures outlined in the UN Charter should friendly negotiations fail. Several 
ideals not mentioned by the TAC but advocated for by the Asian-African Conference’s Ten 
Principles are fundamental human rights, equality of all races and nations, a nation’s right to 
defend itself singly or collectively, respect for justice and international obligations, abstention 
from one country exerting pressure on another, and abstention from arrangements serving a large 
power’s interests.7 The TAC’s principles are echoed in the aims of the APSC. By joining the APSC, 
members pledge to pursue only peaceful avenues of resolving intra-regional disputes and 
recognize that their individual security is fundamentally linked to other members. The Community 
was formed to ensure the region “live[s] at peace with one another and with the world in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment,” to be achieved through conflict prevention and 
resolution, the shaping and sharing of norms, post-conflict peace building, and political 
development.8 
From the above documents and goals, it can be concluded that ASEAN intends to focus 
primarily on situations of outright intra-regional conflict and extra-regional threats, but nothing 
that presents as domestic issues. However, due to terminology and other documents referenced, 
human rights, equality, justice, national identities, social stability, and international obligations 
should also be included when discussing ASEAN’s duties towards maintaining regional peace and 
stability. 
 
6 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia” (1976), 
https://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/. 
7 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Republic of Indonesia, eds., “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955),” Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung, 1955, 161–69, 
http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf. 
8 “ASEAN Political - Security Community,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed January 21, 2020, 
https://asean.org/asean-political-security-community/. 
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The second idea that must be defined is the ASEAN Way. At first glance, it is merely 
ASEAN’s anthem, which goes:  
“Raise our flag high, sky high/Embrace the pride in our heart/ASEAN we 
are bonded as one/Look-in out to the world./For peace, our goal from the very 
start/And prosperity to last./We dare to dream we care to share./Together for 
ASEAN/We dare to dream,/We care to share for it’s the way of ASEAN.”9 
This anthem is the result of a contest held throughout ASEAN states and was integrated 
into the Association’s structure in 2010. It is intended to be an “expression of ASEAN unity,” is 
expected to be played at all formal events, and states are encouraged to translate it into local 
languages and presumably local dialects, to spread ASEAN awareness.10 When studying the lyrics, 
peace and unity are a key component and the idea of being ‘bonded as one,’ combined with other 
ASEAN philosophies, could be understood both as sharing a Southeast Asian identity and as 
working collectively. However, this is not all the ASEAN Way is. An in-depth search of online 
archives and speeches reveals several mentions of the ASEAN Way, made between 1999 and 2004. 
The first, in 1999, was by former ASEAN Secretariat Director Termsak Chalermpalanupap. His 
paper focused on the five biggest challenges that came with enlarging membership and the ASEAN 
Way is mentioned several times. It refers to the ASEAN Way as something that can be utilized 
and while the definition remains ambiguous, the vocabulary employed indicates the values and 
actions it advocates for: equality, quiet persuasion, consultation and consensus, shared 
responsibility, and noninterference.11  
The next mention was in July 2000 by Rodolfo Severino. Severino was ASEAN’s 
Secretary General from 1998-2002 and delivered a speech addressing the importance of 
understanding sovereignty and intervention within ASEAN. While he did not explicitly say the 
phrase ‘ASEAN Way,’ it appears in the title, “Sovereignty, Intervention, and The ASEAN Way.” 
He also addresses aspects of their diplomatic approach, that it is “...based on dialogue, consultation, 
cooperation, engagement and interaction.”12 A year later, Severino delivered another speech and 
 
9 “ASEAN Anthem,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed March 11, 2020, 
https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/asean-anthem/. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “ASEAN-10: Meeting the Challenges,” June 1, 1999, https://asean.org/asean-10-
meeting-the-challenges-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/. 
12 Rodolfo Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention and The ASEAN Way,” In-Person (July 3, 2000), 
https://asean.org/?static_post=sovereignty-intervention-and-the-asean-way-3-july-2000. 
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directly mentioned the ASEAN Way, how it has benefited the member states and since ASEAN’s 
conception has facilitated communication between countries that “still nursed historic 
animosities… and suspicions” without “forcing its incredibly diverse and mutually suspicious 
members into legally binding standards.”13 
The final mention of the ASEAN Way from within the organization was in 2004 by 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, who was also ASEAN’s Chairman from 1998-2001. 
He spoke at an anniversary event and briefly addressed the history and accomplishments of 
ASEAN, acknowledging the ASEAN Way as key to the organization’s success and uniqueness. 
This is the only instance I have found in which a key member of ASEAN attempted to qualitatively 
define the ASEAN Way. However, his definition was not focused on actual steps but instead 
highlighted what characterizes it. He said:  
“The ASEAN Way is a harmonious combination of national priorities and 
the Association’s interests, and a dynamic, wise and flexible approach that enables 
us to optimize our geo-political regional strength…. [it] is manifested in the 
upholding and wise and flexible application of ASEAN fundamental principles, 
including those of consensus and noninterference.”14 
After 2004, it seems the organization stepped back from most direct references of the 
concept. Since then, the ASEAN Way most interested those outside the organization, with scholars 
from a variety of backgrounds having written on it. It has been called a set of rules, principles and 
values, a decision-making process, a working process/style, and a core norm, among other things. 
Though the exact definition varies, one thing is consistent between ASEAN and scholarly sources: 
the ASEAN Way operates as a kind of guiding principle for diplomacy among members. Lee 
Leviter separated the ASEAN Way into two essential components. The first is consensus-based 
decision making and the second, the six principles outlined in the TAC, laid out above.15 Others 
tend not to outline the ASEAN Way so definitively, but most emphasize its focus on 
noninterference, quiet diplomacy, and constructive engagement. Logan Masilamani and Jimmy 
 
13 Rodolfo Severino, “The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law,” In-Person (September 3, 2001), 
https://asean.org/?static_post=the-asean-way-and-the-rule-of-law. 
14 Phan Van Khai, “ASEAN Lecture,” In-Person (August 8, 2004), https://asean.org/asean-lecture-by-he-mr-prime-
minister-phan-van-khai-ha-noi/?highlight=harmonious%20combination%20of%20national%20priorities%20. 
15 Lee Leviter, “The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?,” New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 43, no. 2 (2011): 159–210, 
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib7b9816e38c711e08b05fdf15589d8e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=D
efault&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
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Peterson emphasized what actions constitute the ASEAN Way, particularly “compromise, 
consensus, and consultation in the informal decision-making process.”16 
Amongst these definitions are also opinions on the actual effectiveness of the ASEAN Way. 
Those within ASEAN tend to view it as crucial to the organization’s success, while others perceive 
it as a hindrance. More details on these disparities will be addressed later. Regardless of these 
differences, there is a general consensus on what comprises the ASEAN Way: noninterference, 
cooperation, consensus, and engagement. As such, these will be the guiding principles for this 
thesis to discuss the ASEAN Way’s history implications in the chosen case studies. 
Now that these ideas have been defined, it is appropriate to discuss the research question 
at hand. To understand how utilization of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN politics has affected 
regional peace and stability, I first explore several smaller questions: what is the history and 
significance of ASEAN; what is the significance of the ASEAN Way; and how did ASEAN 
respond in times of conflict and crisis in Myanmar? The first question can be answered primarily 
with documents from ASEAN archives. Though the historical facts preceding the organization’s 
establishment will require some supplemental resources, information on ASEAN’s creation and 
various treaties will be gathered directly from ASEAN primary sources. As this question’s purpose 
is simply to illustrate the importance of ASEAN and what actions it has taken towards regional 
stability, this section does not require an analysis. 
 To answer the second question, I analyze the ASEAN Way from two viewpoints, first 
practical, then slightly more theoretical. The first contextualizes the ASEAN Way from an 
historical angle, as well as discusses procedural and behavioral norms, which Dio Tobing deems 
key components of the ASEAN Way.17 The theoretical viewpoint focuses on the concept of ‘face’, 
to explore the deeper connections ASEAN states have to the ASEAN Way. This is the primary 
area I aim to contribute new information to, as face is not often connected to ASEAN in academic 
writing and has not warranted analyses as extensive as other influences on the ASEAN Way have.  
  Finally, to address the third question, I introduce two case studies from Myanmar: the 
violent 1988 Uprising and the 2012 events of the Rohingya genocide. The nature of these conflicts 
 
16 Logan Masilamani and Jimmy Peterson, “The ‘ASEAN Way’: The Structural Underpinnings of  Constructive 
Engagement,” Foreign Policy Journal, October 15, 2014, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/141015-Masilamani-Peterson-ASEAN.pdf. 
17 Dio H. Tobing, “The Limits and Possibilities of the ASEAN Way: The Case of Rohingya as Humanitarian Issue 
in Southeast Asia,” KnE Social Sciences 3, no. 5 (May 23, 2018): 148–74, https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v3i5.2331. 
2424320  9 
 
necessitates the use of news articles alongside academic sources, and it is through examining these 
cases that I am be able to demonstrate how the ASEAN Way has evolved and impacted regional 
peace and stability in both the past and present, which subsequently allows me to wholly depict 
the answer to my research question. In this section, it is necessary to strike a careful balance, as 
most people discuss such conflicts in the case of humanitarian and human rights issues. While this 
is undoubtedly essential to the broader discussion, given the scope and limitations of this thesis, I 
refrain from analyzing these conflicts in these contexts. Additionally, it is prudent to acknowledge 
that although there is an abundance of information and history that could be included in this thesis, 
due to length restrictions, my research is limited only to the most relevant information, and must 
exclude a significant number of smaller developments. 
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Development of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
 The 1960s in Southeast Asia was a decade full of change, not only for the many states 
adjusting to decolonization, but also for the region as a whole. Leaders from five major Southeast 
Asian states came together in 1967 to establish ASEAN, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) 
that still plays an important role in the region today. ASEAN was not their first attempt at an IGO, 
and it actually ended up replacing two others that had been created earlier that decade. These 
organizations were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. In founding ASEAN, 
the leaders of the original five members created the first Southeast Asian IGO that not only did not 
limit itself in terms of goals, but also opened membership to all Southeast Asian states who 
accepted ASEAN values. These characteristics were both markedly different than those of ASA 
and Maphilindo and likely highly influential in the organization’s longevity. 
 ASA, founded in 1961, comprised Malaya (later part of Malaysia), the Philippines, and 
Thailand, three of that time’s fastest-growing Southeast Asian states. Its focus was limited to 
economic and social progress, and intentionally excluded Indonesia and other states in mainland 
Southeast Asia.18 There were no binding policies that compromised member sovereignty, and 
operations were structured specifically to include all members. The hope was that eventually non-
members would recognize the benefits of cooperating with them and could join upon meeting 
certain criteria. However, two events would prevent this from coming to fruition. First, before 
ASA was fully established, Thailand formed what was essentially a military alliance with the 
United States. This conflicted with the notion that ASA would be free from outside influence and 
cast the organization as aligned with the West, which other members were not keen on. This was 
the case particularly due to the ongoing Cold and Vietnam Wars and uninvolved states did not 
want to have any actual or perceived alignment with either of the major powers involved. Second, 
Malaysia and the Philippines found themselves once again involved in a territorial dispute.19 These 
two events were enough to suspend the majority of ASA operations just a year after its founding 
and led to the development of another IGO. 
 
18 Vincent K. Pollard, “ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism,” Asian Survey 10, no. 3 
(March 1970): 246, https://doi.org/10.2307/2642577. 
19 Donald E. Weatherbee, ASEAN’s Half Century: A Political History of the Association of  Southeast Asian 
Nations (Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 19-20. 
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 Named for its member states, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, Maphilindo was 
established in 1963. The organization only consisted of Malay states and was intended to overcome 
past differences and promote peace, prosperity, and Malay interests. These interests included 
regional security and economic cooperation, and the idea of “Asian solutions to Asian problems”.20 
At the time of founding, Maphilindo promoted close consultation to achieve a consensus of opinion. 
However, the formulation of Maphilindo coincided with the replacement of Malaya by the new 
Federation of Malaysia, created by merging multiple territories into one. This amalgamation was 
met with hostility and heavy opposition from Indonesia, due largely to concerns about the region’s 
power distribution. In response, Indonesia began political and military campaigns to undermine 
and “crush” the new state, which essentially ended Maphilindo before it started.21  
 Four years later, on August 8, 1967, Foreign Ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand met in Bangkok and signed the ASEAN Declaration, 
founding ASEAN.22 This document was originally drafted in December 1966, with the goal of 
establishing a new regional organization called the Southeast Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation. However, this name was later changed upon realization that the acronym SEAARC 
sounded like an obscenity in Malay. In its final draft, this document described the intention of 
SEAARC, renamed ASEAN, as representing “the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia 
to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, 
secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.”23 The 
organization formed was to be characterized by the most important elements comprising ASA and 
Maphilindo. Among other things, these elements included operations based on nonintervention 
and consensus, and ensuring no amount of sovereignty was relinquished by member states. 24 
Additionally, membership would be open to all states in the Southeast Asian region, provided they 
accept and abide by ASEAN’s principles and its goals and purposes: 
1. Economic growth, social progress, and cultural development 
2. Regional peace and stability 
 
20 Alastair M. Taylor, “Malaysia, Indonesia - and Maphilindo,” International Journal 19, no. 2 (1964): 167, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/40198963. 
21 Weatherbee, ASEAN, 20-22. 
22 “History,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed June 4, 2020, https://asean.org/asean/about-
asean/history/. 
23 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “The Asean Declaration.” 
24 Weatherbee, ASEAN, 25. 
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3. Economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative 
collaboration 
4. Mutual assistance in training and research 
5. Collaboration in agriculture and industry, trade, transportation and 
communications, and the improvement of living standards 
6. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies 
7. Cooperation with regional and international organizations25 
The final negotiation process for this document took four days and was held southeast of 
Bangkok, in Bang Saen. The negotiations were informal and done just as much at the negotiating 
table as on the golf course. The Ministers would later dub this manner “sports-shirt diplomacy.”26 
It played a  particularly important role in Bang Saen, as it allowed them to deliberate their historical 
and political differences while introducing general goodwill and humor to diffuse tension, 
maneuver their differences, and find equitable agreements. Over time, ASEAN membership has 
expanded to comprise ten states and a new charter was inaugurated in 2007. It has also seen 
countless declarations and treaties added and has outlasted all of its predecessors combined. The 
organization has played such an important role that forums such as ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+8 
have been created specifically to facilitate negotiations and agreements with states beyond the 
region. One question raised here is why this organization blossomed into such a significant entity 
compared to previous attempts at regional unification.27 
The organization’s successful formulation and resilience can be largely attributed to the 
region’s needs. Apart from superficial characteristics such as geographical location and colonial 
histories, there were few religious, political, or cultural similarities shared by ASEAN’s founding 
members. However, as the region’s leading powers, they realized that regional cooperation was 
essential, lest their and their neighbor’s futures remain in limbo. Cooperation was essential as 
following decolonization, the region experienced a power vacuum which outside influences could 
have exploited for their own political gain. The region was particularly vulnerable in this sense 
due to the presence of the powers entrenched in the ongoing Cold and Vietnam Wars. Furthermore, 
these leaders had witnessed distant alliances easily disintegrate in the direst of times and 
 
25 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “The Asean Declaration.”  
26 “History.” 
27 Ibid. 
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understood the value of fostering strong relationships with their neighbors. Consequently, they 
recognized that their best chance to strengthen, protect, and have their nation’s interests recognized 
internationally was to cooperate and act as one entity, larger than any of their individual states.28 
This recognition of the importance of cooperation and their dedication to it is reflected in 
the aims and goals outlined above. For the purpose of this thesis, the second is of particular interest. 
It expressed their commitment to preserving regional peace and stability, to be pursued by 
maintaining respect for justice and rule of law, as well as by abiding by the principles set out by 
the UN Charter.29 At the signing of the ASEAN Declaration, Indonesian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Adam Malik shared Indonesia’s vision for Southeast Asia: “a region which can stand on 
its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against any negative influence from outside the 
region.”30 Other Ministers added to this, with hopes for a region that takes full responsibility for 
themselves, that stands together to prevent intra-regional conflicts, and that is equipped to bring 
spiritual advancement, stability, and progress to its peoples. Some pushed for military alliances to 
be included in regional stability goals but as Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman recalled, the 
majority of those present at the negotiations were strictly against military arrangements and wanted 
to focus cooperation efforts on other matters.31 
Although the Cold War put pressure on their commitment to regional peace and stability, 
the first major act to further this initiative did not come until 1971. On November 27, the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration, also called the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration 
(ZOPFAN) was signed and executed. This document declared ASEAN’s dedication to “exert the 
initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of 
Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside 
powers.” 32  This was significant in formally communicating to each other and outsiders that 
ASEAN states were taking an active role in crafting the peaceful, autonomous region the Ministers 
envisioned four years earlier. However, this declaration appeared somewhat superfluous as the 
major powers were not expected to heed it, only future members of ASEAN were. Had the 
 
28 Kernial Singh Sandhu and Thanat Khoman, eds., “Forward: ASEAN Conception and Evolution,” in The ASEAN 
Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), xiii–xviii. 
29 “Charter of the United Nations.” 
30 “History.” 
31 Sandhu and Khoman, “Forward: ASEAN,” xiii. 
32 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration” (1971), 
http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/other-20130527-163245-351392.pdf. 
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ZOPFAN been properly observed, all ASEAN members would have had to renounce their extra-
regional security ties.33 
In 1975, ASEAN had the opportunity to set a precedent for how seriously the ZOPFAN 
would be enforced. However, one could argue that objectively, they failed to allow this declaration 
to reach its full potential. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded, occupied, and eventually 
assimilated East Timor as a new province. Although the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) called for Indonesian withdrawal and recognition of East Timorese self-determination, 
all ASEAN states except Singapore voted against this. Singapore chose to abstain, which Indonesia 
perceived as an insult to their agency. This opposition to the UNGA’s denouncement of 
Indonesia’s actions made it clear that although the ZOPFAN highlighted the importance of every 
state’s right to freedom from outside interference, ASEAN states were not holding their own 
members accountable and that this was aimed primarily towards extra-regional powers. Regardless 
of its limited applicability, the ZOPFAN became an integral part of ASEAN identity since it 
contributed at least  conceptually, to the region’s desire to create a Zone of Peace.34 
Another significant move in furthering regional peace and stability was the creation and 
implementation of the Bangkok Treaty, also called the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Although work on this document began in 1987, it was not 
completed until eight years later, on December 15, 1995. This treaty has been an essential part of 
the ZOPFAN and was implemented with the belief that it would further strengthen both regional 
and international security. It strictly prohibits purchasing, creating, testing, or otherwise possessing 
nuclear weapons, as well as improperly disposing radioactive waste and other materials either at 
sea or into the atmosphere.35 However, as it does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy, ASEAN 
members must remain diligent in policing their neighbors and ensuring components for energy 
generation are being used solely for their intended purpose. It should be noted that this is currently 
the only treaty within ASEAN that prohibits weapons of mass destruction. Although the 
organization has subscribed to outside pacts and made statements denouncing the use of biological 
and chemical weaponry, currently only nuclear weapons are outright banned by internal legislation. 
 
33 Weatherbee, ASEAN, 39. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” (1995), 
https://asean.org/?static_post=treaty-on-the-southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone. 
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Many documents and forums within ASEAN seek to address multiple initiatives, and the 
area of peace and stability is no exception. There are additional treaties that highlight regional 
stability, but the two mentioned above are the most significant. In addition to these treaties, various 
groups and mechanisms have been created to better address regional security cooperation. The 
earliest one was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, to create an environment better 
formatted for discussion and consultation on political and security matters, as well as aid in 
confidence building and preventative diplomacy in the broader Asia-Pacific region. The Forum 
involves not only ASEAN states, but also many others either located in or who maintain an interest 
in the Asia-Pacific area, including Australia, China, North and South Korea, the European Union, 
the US, and others.36 Two similar but more practical groups are the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Like the 
ARF, ADMM promotes stability through dialogue, cooperation, and trust building. It has allowed 
ASEAN members to work together more effectively and implement additional initiatives such as 
Defence Interaction Programmes and the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological and 
Radiological Defence Experts. 37  ADMM-Plus is essentially the same as ADMM but larger, 
including ASEAN’s eight dialogue partners, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Republic of Korea, Russia, and the US. Areas ADMM-Plus has targeted include maritime security, 
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and 
cyber security.38 
 Two other mechanisms created to further promote regional peace and stability are the TAC 
and the APSC, which were both briefly discussed in the introduction. The TAC particularly 
emphasized noninterference and established a framework to better allow for the settlement of 
disputes. Furthermore, it was opened to states beyond the Southeast Asian region in 1987, giving 
the treaty and its principles international significance.39 The APSC on the other hand, has not been 
opened to states outside of Southeast Asia. It is one of three pillars of a larger ASEAN Community 
and this particular branch was created to ensure states remain at peace with each other and those 
outside the region. By participating in this Community, members have vowed to utilize only 
 
36 “About ARF,” ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed June 12, 2020, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/. 
37 “About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM),” ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM), 
February 6, 2017, https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm.html. 
38 “About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus),” ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
(ADMM), February 6, 2017, https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html. 
39 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.” 
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peaceful methods when approaching intra-regional disputes and remain highly aware that their 
securities are intricately linked to one another. Furthermore, the APSC has developed its own 
Blueprint, which imagines ASEAN as a rule-based Community, sharing values and security 
responsibilities, and operating as a cohesive and fluid region.40 
 The final mechanism that should be mentioned here is ASEAN’s Vision 2020. This was 
drafted in 1997 and outlined ASEAN leaders’ hopes and goals for the organization to achieve by 
2020. The document described a region living in peace and harmony, and listed numerous 
economic and social goals, but neglected to outline necessary steps to attain these goals. 41 
Designing a strategy was deferred until 1998, when the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) was created.42 
The HPA consisted of ten categories and over 200 recommendations to achieve Vision 2020. The 
7th category focused on strengthening regional peace and stability, and called for supporting 
existing mechanisms, namely the ZOPFAN, SEANWFZ, and TAC. The 8th category highlighted 
ASEAN and the ARF’s role in enforcing peace, justice, and moderation, and called for increasing 
their presence for such initiatives beyond the region.43 However, overall, the HPA did not break 
any new ground for the Association, and instead primarily focused on emphasizing, ascertaining, 
and strengthening the aims, initiatives, and plans already in place.44 
 The various treaties and mechanisms above reinforce ASEAN’s dedication to creating a 
stable and peaceful region. However, many endorse the same goals and actions, fostering notions 
of redundancy when studying the history of the Association. One concept that is repeated in nearly 
every security initiative pursued by ASEAN is noninterference. ASEAN members very clearly 
chose this as one of their core guiding principles, and through the following analysis of the ASEAN 
Way, it will become apparent just how inextricable noninterference is in the organization’s 
operations. 
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Significance of the ASEAN Way 
 
 Earlier, this thesis examined sources from within and beyond ASEAN in an attempt to 
define what the ASEAN Way is. The conclusion reached was that it is an approach to diplomacy, 
characterized by several elements: noninterference, consensus, cooperation, and engagement. 
There have been conflicting opinions on the legitimacy of this approach and while some describe 
the ASEAN Way as ineffective, others, particularly those within the organization, credit part of 
ASEAN’s success and longevity to this approach. By examining the history and intricacies 
surrounding the ASEAN Way, its significance can be understood, as well as how it has played a 
role and whether or not it will continue to play one in the region’s diplomacy, even as it and the 
organization’s actions face outside criticism. 
 When discussing the development and significance of the ASEAN Way, it is imperative to 
understand not only the history of ASEAN, but also member states’ cultures. Recall the role of 
ASA, Maphilindo, and their member states in the foundation of ASEAN. Both organizations 
maintained some shared norms and values, which helped create the foundation for a common 
culture within ASEAN. Each organization’s norms were based in tradition. Maphilindo’s members 
committed themselves to a method that originated from Javanese culture and is said to be the origin 
of Asian-style informal meetings that avoid controversial topics.45 These are musyawarah and 
mufakat. Musyawarah is decision making process, achieved through discussion and consultation, 
while mufakat is the consensual decision that results from it. However, the ASEAN Way takes on 
an exaggerated understanding of consensus that musyawarah does not. While disagreements were 
not common, they were still acknowledged in musyawarah. The idea of consensus was constructed 
so that “each of the participants' views formed a line of least deviation from their original stand.”46 
Although it is peculiar to think that the ASEAN Way, which is employed by many distinct states, 
originated from small Indonesian village culture, it is not far-reaching to partially credit it to the 
development of the present-day approach. Indonesia holds a major role in the region and since the 
 
45 Gillian Goh, “The ‘ASEAN Way’ Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management,” Stanford 
Journal of East Asian Affairs 3, no. 1 (2003): 113-114, 
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other members of Maphilindo embraced musyawarah, it can be assumed that at least part of it was 
integrated into ASEAN when the three members helped found the new organization. 
 Of ASA, Thai Foreign Minister Khoman stated that the organization was rooted in “Asian 
culture and traditions,” though this sounds very simple compared to the actual roots.47 Tobing 
writes about these, stating that there are two key elements comprising the ASEAN Way: behavioral 
norms and procedural norms. Neither of these refer to any concrete political plans or goals, but 
rather focus on concepts and principles intended to further cooperation and diplomacy. The former 
focuses on states’ commitment to state sovereignty. Though there is no definitive reasoning behind 
this, the general consensus among scholars is that sovereignty is highly revered due to the region’s 
history with colonialism and imperialism. To avoid repetition of the past, ASEAN states made 
sovereignty key in establishing a cooperative environment and maintaining regional order.48 The 
latter, procedural norms, describe how individuals should go about negotiations and diplomatic 
matters. The norms advocated for include: “the principle of seeking agreement and harmony, the 
principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, 
private and elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being non-
Cartesian, non-legalistic.”49 Although these are being discussed in reference to ASA, some of these 
were also present in Maphilindo.  
These procedural norms are rooted in history as well as culture. The ideas of personalistic, 
informal, and non-contractual politics that comprised these Asian cultures and traditions existed 
long before the “sports-shirt diplomacy” employed in 1967. Before the colonial period, local 
political systems and empires overlapped and were short-lived. As such, most lacked standing 
armies, bureaucracies, or even stable borders and an empire’s success was dependent on a ruler’s 
ability to manage personal power relationships. After decolonization, there was the development 
of what some specialists call ‘bureaucratic polities,’ a system in which most Southeast Asian states 
were ran by a small circle of elite individuals, influenced by sponsors and patrons. This system 
entrenched a private and informal approach into the region’s larger political culture. As such, 
 
47 Goh, “The ‘ASEAN Way,’” 113-114. 
48 Tobing, “The Limits and Possibilities,” 151. 
49 Ibid; Non-Cartesian thinking assumes mind and body are intertwined and cannot be separated, so in this case it 
can be understood as all Southeast Asian countries being inseparable from one another. 
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public political debate and criticism was strongly eschewed, as any dissent could be perceived as 
lack of loyalty and a threat to those in power.50  
 Even if these deeper historical roots were not a factor, noninterference and consensus likely 
would have eventually developed out of concern for state sovereignty. Excluding Thailand, all of 
Southeast Asia was under colonial control until the mid-1900s. Upon gaining independence, the 
governments faced the challenge of nation building while being plagued by domestic obstacles. 
These obstacles included civil wars, violent insurgencies, armed rebellions, numerous racial, 
ethnic, and religious riots, alongside other security issues caused by extra-regional powers. 
External pressures only served to exacerbate domestic issues and solidified Southeast Asian states’ 
valuation of state sovereignty in the pursuit of national and regional stability.51 However, not all 
scholars agree that the ASEAN Way has historical roots. Amitav Acharya points out that many 
regional organizations develop their norms based off those of global or other regional 
organizations, as well as the current local political, social, and cultural environment. His argument 
states that key elements of the ASEAN Way, namely noninterference and avoidance of the use of 
force, were integrated based on the UN Charter and global norms. Some other organizations he 
names as influences in ASEAN’s formation of its norms are the Organization of African Unity and 
the Organization of American States.52 While this is a compelling argument and Foreign Minister 
Khoman acknowledged that the European Community had been a model from which to build 
ASEAN, there is still the reality that the founders of ASEAN themselves acknowledged the 
influence of Southeast Asian values and cultures.53 The fact of historical and cultural influences 
here is undeniable. 
 The above speaks to the core development of the ASEAN Way, but not to the propagation 
of it. Without proper promotion and enshrinement of the above concepts, this specific approach 
likely would not have become so mainstream within the organization. Presently, it still plays a role 
and its roots are now far more substantial than they once were. ASEAN members legally bound 
themselves to noninterference when creating the TAC and its six principles, going so far as to 
include the phrase ‘noninterference’ in the third one.54 The principles and goals of the ARF and 
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ADMM also formally affirmed their commitment to noninterference. Furthermore, during the 
Second Bali Concord in 2003, ASEAN members once again recognized the “underpinnings of 
sovereignty and noninterference…. [and their] rights… to pursue their individual foreign policies 
and defense arrangements” when creating the ASEAN Security Community, later renamed the 
APSC.55 
 I have shown that the ideas of noninterference and consensus are rooted deeply within the 
historical and legal aspects of ASEAN, but these alone do not fully contextualize their significance. 
Noninterference and consensus, synonymous to indirectness and harmony, have long been valued 
in everyday social interactions in Southeast Asia and are key to the idea of ‘face’. In Western 
cultures, face is most often related to honor or reputation. However, the understanding of it in 
Asian cultures is far more intricate. Complex though it may be face is not a new topic in academia. 
Many scholars have written on it and have composed varying definitions on what it is, some 
imagining it as a public image and others imagining it as a private or ‘self-oriented’ one.56 Joo Yup 
Kim and Sang Hoon Nam highlight several of these definitions in their article discussing face and 
organizational behavior.57 I will approach face as public image and adopt D. Y. F. Ho’s 1976 
definition: 
“[face is] the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for 
himself from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social 
network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that 
position as well as acceptably in his general conduct.” 58  
This may be unclear, so an example by Bloodworth has been included here to better 
illustrate the difference between honor and face: “A man of honor may only give a blind man a 
penny, but he does not rob him; a man concerned about ‘his’ face may rob the blind man if no one 
is looking, but will ostentatiously give him a dime once enough people are.” 59  Thus, the 
understanding of face applied here is more concerned with public appearances and opinions than 
personal character. Face can be gained, lost, and saved, and some have coined the term ‘facework’ 
 
55 Weatherbee, ASEAN, 178. 
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to describe the efforts made to save face. Facework is done regularly within social interactions and 
professional organizations alike. This is to avoid shame and embarrassment which could cause an 
upset in a social interaction and loss of face for all involved. Scheff suggested that the 
embarrassment and shame associated with losing face can be felt individually as well as by groups 
and even countries.60 Ho pinpointed three situations in which face can be lost: 
1. When one fails to meet others’ expectations associated with his/her social status. 
2. When one is not treated by others as respectfully as his/her face deserves. 
3. When one’s in-group members (relatives, immediate subordinates) fail to meet 
their social roles.61 
In face-saving cultures, losing or threatening another’s face can have serious implications 
and there are more situations to be considered than just those listed above. For example, if someone 
holding a position of power experiences either a loss or threat to their face, it could be interpreted 
as their legitimacy in holding that position is being questioned. Being openly rejected or ridiculed 
can cause loss of face and threatening another’s can trigger feelings of resentment and conflict. 
One must be careful when existing within a hierarchy, as being ‘defeated’ by someone of the same 
rank is one of the most serious ways to lose face. It is also important to note that face is not only 
public but is also communal, in the sense that it is ‘on loan’ from the larger group and that one 
person misconducting themselves can cause everyone associating with them to lose face.62 
Kim and Nam argue that without understanding the concept of face, it is nearly impossible 
to understand organizational behavior in Asia. Furthermore, they hypothesize that the process of 
saving face hinders creativity and innovation within organizations.63 That being said, the question 
that arises here is why is face not more widely addressed within conversations about ASEAN and 
the ASEAN Way? The majority of articles written about the concept of face focus on Chinese and 
Japanese origins. 64  Though there is no definitive answer, Nair observes that in reference to 
ASEAN, members seem to essentialize face, which he hypothesizes has resulted in the lack of 
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scholarship on face within ASEAN.65 This is a significant oversight in the literature as face has 
been observed in multiple Southeast Asian cultures, directly referenced by ASEAN leaders, and is 
an integral, albeit discreet element of the ASEAN Way . Former Malaysian Secretary General Ajit 
Singh said in the ASEAN Way, “face is very important and every effort is made to ensure that no 
party feels hurt in an argument or a discussion.” 66  Singaporean diplomat Walter Woon also 
commented on the concept of face, calling it an “essential aspect” of ASEAN diplomacy and 
saying that the ASEAN Way is “a desire not to lose face in public or to make other members lose 
face.” 67 Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak additionally brought up the roles of culture 
and Asian family values, saying that ASEAN’s commitment to these values ensured that Myanmar 
has not lost face and has been successfully coaxed into reforms. 
Scholars often identify face within ASEAN as a result of “Southeast Asian mentalities,” 
usually in culturalist terms and occasionally going so far as to denounce it for putting an ‘Oriental’ 
spin on diplomacy.68 This is interesting to consider, because while the deeper intricacies of face 
might be unique to Asian cultures, applying moderate facework and using non-confrontational 
methods of diplomacy is not. One such example is constructive engagement, which is generally 
considered to be part of the ASEAN Way. 69  It is a method in which one state focuses on 
encouraging gradual political and social change in another, by engaging and maintaining relations 
with them and avoiding harsh restrictions such as sanctions. It is meant to encourage change 
privately, while avoiding embarrassing or alienating the targeted state. It used by Thailand towards 
Myanmar in 1991 and has continued to be present in ASEAN political strategies. However, this 
tactic originated in the 1980s as U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s administration’s attempt at better 
influencing South Africa. As such, the criticism ASEAN diplomats receive for ‘Orientalizing’ 
diplomacy is misplaced, particularly as methods of nonconfrontational diplomacy are not unique 
to them, despite their claiming it is. 
This is not to say all critiques of the ASEAN Way are invalid. Many have described it as a 
“recipe for paralysis” and ineffective and inefficient, leading to long and fruitless meetings. Others 
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have highlighted that ASEAN’s reputation as an “outward-looking” organization has been 
tarnished by strict adherence to noninterference, regardless of international law violations within 
member states.70 Furthermore, the organization has a tendency to put aside problems that it cannot 
reach a consensus on. The emphasis on noninterference and consensus has also been cited as 
damaging to the region. One example was when ASEAN members decided not to warn Bangkok 
about its apparent mismanagement of the national economy. Likewise, noninterference was cited 
as the reason Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad’s frequent and highly 
vocal critiques of Western capitalism and financial speculators were left unchecked, despite the 
damage it brought to the region’s economy.71 Tobing identifies four actions ASEAN states are 
expected to strictly adhere to in the name of noninterference: 
1. Refrain from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own 
people, including violation of human rights and from making the domestic 
political system of states and the political styles of governments a basis for 
deciding their membership in ASEAN. 
2. Refrain from criticizing the actions of states which were deemed to have 
breached the noninterference principle. 
3. Deny recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group 
seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring state. 
4. Provide political support and material assistance to member states in their 
campaign against subversive and destabilizing activities.72 
Due to their adherence to these actions the Association has faced criticism about its 
capability to resolve disputes and enforce international norms. Not only that, but the organization’s 
dedication to the ASEAN Way and noninterference has also been a point of contention among 
scholars. ASEAN has been candid in their denouncement of extra-regional interference but 
maintains a primarily silent demeanor towards internal affairs. This was especially apparent during 
the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia, mentioned above. This event led to the death of almost 
200,000 people within East Timor. Regardless, ASEAN states maintained their silence.73 Another 
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example of ASEAN Way failure is the Philippines’ and Malaysia’s territorial dispute over Sabah. 
This dispute began in the 1960s and despite ASEAN’s involvement, is still unresolved.74 On the 
other hand, ASEAN has received some praise over its role in this dispute because although they 
have not been able to help resolve it, they have been credited with reducing tensions and preventing 
the situation from further deteriorating.75 Praise of this kind is fairly common for the ASEAN Way 
from politicians and scholars alike. Although a disproportionate amount of approval comes from 
leaders within ASEAN, it is not uncommon for literature about the ASEAN Way to acknowledge 
some of the organization’s successful work towards general regional stability. 
The importance of the ASEAN Way was particularly highlighted in reference to issues that 
resulted from expanding membership. This is because it provided a way to ‘settle old animosities’ 
while also ensuring political equality among states, regardless of size or economic 
dependence/influence. It also permits states of many different political and philosophical 
backgrounds to cooperate. Former Singaporean Foreign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar said that 
“ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this principle of noninterference is the key reason why 
no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since [its] founding...”76 
The wording ‘ASEAN countries’ here is crucial. While there has not been military conflict 
between ASEAN member states, the region as a whole, including non-ASEAN states, has not been 
free of conflict. Regardless, ASEAN leaders count this as a victory and have largely credited the 
progress the region has made since the 1960s to the ASEAN Way.77 Another point of praise among 
leaders is the dynamic nature of the ASEAN Way. It is described as flexible and can adapt as the 
organization progresses, without losing its key principles. This point has contributed to the 
argument for keeping the operations of the organization the same. Director Chalermpalanupap 
concurred with this point, saying “there is no valid reason to change something that has worked 
successfully for over three decades.” 78 
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Has it actually been successful though? Before introducing case studies, it is important to 
examine how the ASEAN Way has been used over the years. Generally, the ASEAN Way calls 
for diplomacy and quiet persuasion of the majority, and those reluctant will eventually be 
persuaded by peer pressure.79 This appears to be against the true nature of consensus but one must 
remember that here, face is a factor and the pressure to conform and meet the expectations of others 
is tied tightly to saving one’s face.80 This influence by face is particularly evident in ASEAN 
meetings, as negotiations do not only involve ASEAN officials. General staffing members, those 
intended to service ASEAN meetings, are expected to guard the faces of state representatives and 
allow for better negotiations. As they do not represent any state directly, they are expected to act 
as go-betweens and handle delicate matters, preventing arguments and awkward interactions by 
calling for breaks or shelving difficult issues. This allows officials to discuss things informally and 
agree informally, before coming back to the negotiation table.81 Additionally, if a member misses 
a meeting, the ASEAN Way, not face, dictates that they are obligated to accept whatever decision 
was made in their absence.82 
These characteristics have been present since the creation of ASEAN. However, given the 
dynamic nature of the ASEAN Way, some changes have ensued. In the early 2000s, the idea of 
‘enhanced interaction’ was introduced. This allowed for public commentary on the domestic 
affairs and policies of another state, given they affected the region as well. This idea was embraced 
as a progression of noninterference by older members, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines and they began to emphasize the importance of coordination and cooperation. On the 
other hand, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos held steadfastly to the original definition of 
noninterference which specifically forbade external intervention and public discussion of domestic 
affairs.83 This discrepancy may seem trivial but given the central role noninterference and the 
ASEAN Way play in ASEAN diplomacy, such a disparity significantly affects the permissibility 
of having conversations about internal issues with broader consequences. 
  
 
79 Ibid. 
80 Kim and Nam, “The Concept and Dynamics,” 530. 
81 Nair, “Saving Face,” 691. 
82 Chalermpalanupap, “ASEAN-10.” 
83 Leviter, “The ASEAN Charter,” 162-195; Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, “The Responsibility to 
Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-Interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility,” The Pacific Review 24, no. 
2 (May 2011): 179–200, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.560958. 
2424320  26 
 
Myanmar and ASEAN: 
Two Case Studies 
 
To understand how ASEAN and the ASEAN Way have impacted regional peace and 
stability, I will analyze two events in Burmese history: the 1988 Uprising and the ongoing 
Rohingya genocide. Both events resulted in widespread violence, murder, and mass exoduses out 
of Myanmar. These were chosen for comparison due to the similar situations ASEAN found 
themselves in, and the opportunity to deviate from past decisions that was presented to them by 
the second case. By analyzing these case studies and knowing the context of the history and 
significance of ASEAN and the ASEAN Way, I demonstrate how this approach has impacted the 
region. 
The origins of Burma’s 1988 Uprising, better known as the 8888 Uprising or the Four-
Eight Democratic Moment, goes back to March 1962. That month, the Tatmadaw, Burma’s armed 
forces, instigated a coup and placed General Ne Win in power. Win instituted the ‘Burmese Way 
to Socialism’ and instituted a period of isolationism and economic privatization that degraded 
Burma from the largest exporter of rice and “Asia’s Rice Bowl” to one of the poorest countries in 
the world. 84 The government further exacerbated the country’s impoverished state in September 
1987, by demonetizing 80% of the currency. This caused widespread student protests and 
universities were shut down in retaliation. Protests erupted once again on March 13, 1988 
following the fatal shooting of a university student by police in Rangoon. From March 14 to 18, 
thousands marched and demonstrated on university campuses in the capital. During this time, 
hundreds of protestors were arrested, at least one thousand were shot at, about 200 were beaten to 
death or drowned, and 41 suffocated in the back of an overcrowded police vehicle. Once again, 
universities were shut down to quell the unrest.85 
Universities reopened June 15 and protests resumed across the country. The junta 
implemented a curfew and once again arrested thousands. Groups of students and Buddhist monks 
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demonstrating were attacked, driven into, and shot at by the Lon Htein force, Burma’s Riot 
Security Police. Faced with widespread social dissent, Win resigned on July 23, and was replaced 
by General Sein Lwin, who was nicknamed “Rangoon’s Butcher” for his commanding role in 
March and June’s excessively violent responses against protestors. He assumed the position of 
President of the Republic of Burma and Chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party. and 
declared martial law on August 3. This was an attempt to restore order as rumors of mass protests 
on August 8 began to spread.86  
At 8:00am on August 8, hundreds of thousands of students, monks, women, civil servants, 
and even low-ranking soldiers attended demonstrations in Rangoon and cities all over the country. 
The date, 8/8/88 is where the name ‘8888 Uprising’ comes from and was chosen for the number 
8’s auspiciousness in Buddhism and Burmese culture. 87  Participants remained peaceful and 
civilian leaders delivered speeches and facilitated open political discussions, something that had 
been banned for over two decades. By the late afternoon, government officials issued orders to 
disperse, which were ignored and at 11:00pm, Tatmadaw personnel appeared in the streets firing 
warning shots, before haphazardly opening fire on the crowds.88 
The indiscriminate shooting of civilians continued most of the next day, and in retaliation 
civilians burned down police stations, attacked authorities, and beheaded six policemen and one 
informant. August 10 brought even more violence when a Tatmadaw squadron raided Rangoon 
General Hospital searching for civilian leaders. Already wounded demonstrators, blood donors, 
doctors, and nurses were indiscriminately targeted. After another day of protests and violence, 
Lwin announced his resignation on August 12. He was replaced by Dr. Maung Maung, who 
immediately withdrew the army, which gave civilians a false sense of victory. With the absence 
of the Tatmadaw, protests and civilian strategy meetings continued mostly unhindered, but rumors 
about the government’s response and about mass prison breaks roused panic and threw the country 
into a state of anarchy. Neighborhoods barricaded and armed themselves, bringing government 
functions, domestic and international travel, exports, and the economy to a halt. Government 
factories, warehouses, and police stations were ransacked and occupied, and vigilante justice was 
rampant, resulting in beheadings and the lynching of common criminals in the streets. This chaos 
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87 Ibid. 
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ended on September 18, 1988 when General Saw Maung took power following another coup. He 
was backed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was later renamed 
the State Peace and Development Council and would stay in power until 2011.89  
Muang reinstated martial law and the army quashed the unrest, resulting in an estimated 
1,500 civilian casualties in one week. Within just two weeks of seizing power, SLORC destroyed 
the Four-Eight Democratic Moment and to prevent further protests closed all universities until the 
year 2000.90 Following these events, Maung and other SLORC officials severely downplayed 
statistics, declaring a maximum of 850 arrests and 516 deaths, 500 of whom were ‘looters.’ These 
numbers grossly underestimate the full extent of damage done. The most credible sources cite the 
death toll at 3,000, but this is an estimate due to reports of the military removing bodies from the 
streets to lower the official casualty count, which resulted in many people being labeled as 
disappeared instead of deceased. Other estimates, which include statements from the All Burma 
Students Democratic front, non-governmental organizations, exiled government officials, and 
foreign diplomats cite the number of casualties at anywhere between 3,000-10,000.91 Additionally, 
an estimated 10,000 people fled to Thailand as refugees. This number would further rise two years 
later, following the 1990 elections. SLORC organized this election to legitimize their regime but 
after Aung San Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 82% of the votes, the 
results were annulled, NLD leaders were imprisoned, and Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest 
for almost 15 years.92 
Following the widespread state-sanctioned violence of 1988, ASEAN’s and the 
international community’s relationship with Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989, was tumultuous. 
The international community responded strongly, cutting essentially all international aid, 
implementing sanctions, and excluding Myanmar from multilateral organizations.93 In contrast, 
ASEAN, remained relatively quiet. Their response was not evident until the late 1990s to early 
2000s and it was more closely linked to the 1990 election. When they finally responded to the 
actions of the junta, it was partly due to international pressures and partly because the ongoing 
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detention of Suu Kyi was a “deep source of embarrassment for ASEAN.”94 Members were split 
between two tactics: isolate and punish Myanmar’s government or engage with an open-door 
policy, which included investing in, trading with, and even recognizing the junta to work towards 
liberalization. As a way of international appeasement, saving face, and abiding by the principle of 
noninterference, the Association favored the latter, with Thailand and Singapore leading the 
implementation of informal consultation and constructive engagement.95 
The international community did not particularly approve of this response and ASEAN 
continued to face criticism. Regardless, they continued to pursue change this way, as they believed 
directly condemning Myanmar would have a variety of negative consequences. They specifically 
advocated for engagement over sanctions because of their belief that gentle encouragement would 
accelerate economic development and political change without hurting the lower and middle 
classes like sanctions would.96 Furthermore, they felt that caution and restraint was necessary, lest 
Myanmar revert to isolationism.97 The junta was slowly opening itself to outside dialogue and 
ASEAN leaders, who envisioned an organization that encompassed the entire region, worried that 
the window of opportunity to integrate Myanmar was fleeting. 98  They also aimed to reduce 
Chinese influence in Myanmar and the region as a whole. They worried harsh consequences would 
result in the junta relying solely on China and employed engagement to mitigate Myanmar’s 
Chinese dependence. Finally, ASEAN states were eager to gain access to Myanmar’s resources, 
including fish, timber, gems, and cheap labor.99 
I speculate that beyond these practical concerns, ASEAN states utilized constructive 
engagement and the ASEAN Way to protect themselves and Myanmar. One justification for their 
approach was that sanctions and other serious repercussions would have violated the ZOPFAN 
and TAC.100 However, Myanmar was not bound by these treaties as it was not a member of 
ASEAN and would not be until 1997. In the case of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, the latter 
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was and still is not a member and therefore it could reasonably be argued that it was not protected 
by the ZOPFAN and its guarantees to freedom from interference. Assuming this line of reasoning, 
it is curious why ASEAN would ignore treaties in one case but abide by them in the other. One 
reasonable conclusion is that ASEAN was concerned about saving face. Recall that one entity’s 
loss of face can affect all present, and that criticizing or being criticized is reason to lose face. 
Though ASEAN still faced international disapproval and a loss of reputation, their actions, or lack 
thereof, saved Myanmar’s government from being embarrassed and shamed by its neighbors. This 
preserved Myanmar’s and ASEAN’s face and kept relations open enough to eventually grant 
Myanmar ASEAN membership. 
Following admittance, Myanmar’s junta made it clear that they would continue following 
their own political agenda, and actually increased its repression of opposition groups. Thai Foreign 
Minister Dr. Surin Pitsuwan insisted that their actions and the waves of Burmese refugees coming 
to Thailand were causing regional security issues. However, Myanmar relied heavily on the 
ASEAN Way and noninterference principle to avoid discussions about this. In the past, the promise 
of ASEAN membership was used to negotiate with the junta. However, this advantage was lost 
upon their admission and ASEAN found itself encumbered by a member that largely refused to 
compromise.101 It was not until after 2004 that ASEAN attitudes towards Myanmar shifted from 
strict adherence of noninterference to applying light pressure for reform. This came after decades 
of critique and decay of the Association’s prestige due to their relatively blasé approach. 102 
Members regarded Myanmar’s reckless agency and negative impact on ASEAN’s reputation with 
varying degrees of importance. The Philippines were highly concerned and refused to ratify the 
new ASEAN Charter unless Myanmar committed to restoring democracy and freed Suu Kyi.103 
Likewise, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad blamed Myanmar for ASEAN’s 
embarrassment and threatened expulsion from ASEAN if they did not release Suu Kyi, though 
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra rejected this threat.104 
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The Rohingya genocide has been another instance of violence in Myanmar. The Rohingya 
are a Muslim minority living in the western Rakhine State, alongside Buddhist Rakhine/Arakanese 
people. The Rohingya can trace their roots in the area to the 7th century and after Burma gained 
independence in 1948, they were recognized as a minority ethnic group.105 However, after General 
Win’s 1962 coup he promoted extreme nationalistic sentiments which resulted in the systematic 
marginalization and eradication of the Rohingya, both by the ruling regime and the Buddhist-
majority populace. In the 1970s, the junta launched the Nagamin project, intended to differentiate 
locals and foreigners. The Rohingya were designated foreigners, and many had their IDs 
confiscated. Following widespread destruction of mosques, murder, and rape in 1978, more than 
200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, whose government worked with Burma to repatriate many 
of them, who were subsequently placed in camps. This began a regular cycle of Rohingya 
movement, and other events of mass violence would occur in 1992, 2001, 2009, 2012 and 2015.106 
Discrimination and persecution of the Rohingya has been systematic and perpetrated by 
both government and civilian factions. In 1948, the Union Citizenship Act promised the Rohingya 
citizenship, but the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law rescinded this and the government has also 
attempted to strip them of their identity. The term ‘Rohingya’ is used only by the international 
community. Within Myanmar, its use is rejected and they are considered illegal Bengali migrants, 
called ‘Bengali’ or ‘Kalars,’ which traditionally referred to people of Indian origin but is now used 
as a derogatory term.107 They are regularly dehumanized and within broader Burmese society are 
dubbed cockroaches, inhumane, and diseased. As Myanmar does not recognize them, they are the 
world’s largest stateless group, and before August 2017, there was an estimated one million 
Rohingya living in ghettos and being subjected to forced labor, restrictions on education and 
employment, involuntary birth control, sexual violence, forced relocation, murder, religious and 
cultural discrimination, and other kinds of oppression.108 
 Though this problem has persisted for several decades, I have chosen to focus on the events 
of 2012. In May, three Muslim men sexually assaulted and murdered a Rakhine woman. These 
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men were identified as Rohingya, and in retaliation hundreds of Arakanese ambushed a bus 
carrying Muslims, beating and killing 10 of them as police watched.109 Five days later on June 8, 
Rohingya Muslims rioted, killing many Arakanese and burning down their homes. This resulted 
in mass violence between the groups, with law enforcement and military personnel only involving 
themselves in the violence against the Rohingya. Eventually, Muslims were targeted as the 
instigators and mass arrests of Rohingya followed, alongside the displacement of at least 75,000 
others from their homes. After this, Arakanese leaders and even Buddhist monks started calling 
for economic and social isolation of Muslims, some going even advocating for the “ethnic 
cleansing” of Muslims from the area. Then-President Thein Sein said that the “only solution” to 
mediate the ongoing conflict was to “expel ‘illegal’ Rohingya to other countries.”110 In October, 
violence erupted across nine different towns and Rohingya Muslims are once again targeted and 
attacked, leaving about 40,000 more displaced and an estimated 70 dead. After this incident, the 
government claimed only 12 people were killed. From this point forward, Muslims continued to 
be subjected to violence, with state security forces perpetrating sexual crimes against Rohingya 
women. These atrocities were similar to what had been happening for decades and despite state 
denial, was and continues to be supported by government security forces and overlooked by 
government officials. 
 As recently as 2017, Human Rights Watch released data showing 214 Rohingya villages 
have been burned down, about 640,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar, and about 300,000 live in 
Internally Displaced Person camps, which have been compared to Jewish ghettos. Images released 
with the above data conclude that violence against the Rohingya has reached the level of 
genocide.111 In an effort to escape, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh or 
boarded boats attempting to reach Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Australia. Fellow Southeast 
Asian states have not been particularly helpful in the plight of the Rohingya. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that in 2012, 13,000 Rohingya refugees arrived in Malaysia 
by boat, and Thailand has tallied an additional 6,000 that arrived on their shores since October 
 
109 Human Rights Watch, “All You Can Do Is Pray” : Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (New York, Ny: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/518230524.html. 
110 Ibid, 22. 
111 Mutaqin, “The Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” 21-23; Tobing, “The Limits and Possibilities,” 159. 
2424320  33 
 
2012.112 Several hundred others have been lost at sea, and thousands more were turned away at the 
shores of other countries or left stranded, drifting in Southeast Asian waters for months. It was not 
until 2015 that Indonesia and Malaysia began permitting these groups of ‘boat people’ temporary 
refuge.113 
 International response has been significantly different than in the past. Prior to the violence 
of 2012, the EU had been lifting sanctions and when these events transpired, they claimed to be 
‘in touch’ with officials and ‘closely monitor[ing]’ the situation.114 The US, UK, and even the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation responded similarly, releasing standard denunciations and 
stating they were “deeply concerned” and would continue to monitor developments, without taking 
any serious action.115 Responses were generally insignificant until after the events of 2015. Still, 
it was not until 2017 that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussei 
called the events in Myanmar a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and criticized State 
Counsellor Suu Kyi. She had been released from house arrest in 2010 and entered office in 2016 
and could potentially face criminal charges relating to genocide due to her lack of action.116 
ASEAN’s response was also sluggish and underwhelming. Though the organization sent aid to the 
Rohingya, there was no substantial attempt at addressing the issue until years later. Once again, 
hard criticism was avoided, as even simple statements could be considered interference and cause 
tension between ASEAN members. They continued to employ constructive engagement and 
eventually Myanmar allowed discussion of the situation “in the Rakhine state” and asked for 
“constructive support” from its neighbors.117 However, it would be negligent not to point out that 
this came only after almost 25 years of engagement and denial, and still has not resolved the issue. 
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The impact this crisis has had on the region is undeniable and many, excluding ASEAN, 
consider it a humanitarian and human rights issue. I argue that it is also one of security and stability. 
Not only has Thai Foreign Minister Pitsuwan identified the threat mass exoduses pose to regional 
stability, but the UN and Amnesty International have also linked human rights to regional 
security. 118  Furthermore, in at least one instance the animosity between the Rohingya and 
Arakanese escalated outside of Myanmar, resulting in the death of 8 Buddhists in an Indonesian 
jail.119 Finally, recall the earlier analysis of what constitutes a disruption to regional peace and 
stability. It was concluded that ASEAN primarily recognizes situations of outright inter-state 
conflict. However, due to document structures, other organizations and conferences referenced, 
and adoption of the UN Charter, technically ASEAN has a responsibility to the maintenance of 
human rights, equality, justice, national identities, social stability, and international obligation. It 
is clear that the situation in Myanmar disrupts almost all of these, and even if ASEAN is in denial 
of the disruptions and its responsibilities to mediate them, they cannot deny their international 
obligation. 
International obligation is emphasized by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It was 
adopted by the UNGA in 2005, is endorsed by ASEAN member states, and comprises three main 
ideas: 
1. The responsibility of each state to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help other states 
abide by this. 
2. The responsibility to use peaceful methods to intervene and protect populations 
from the crimes listed above in a timely and decisive manner when their own 
state fails to do so. This includes the responsibility of relevant regional 
organizations to cooperate with the international community to intervene 
appropriately. 
 
118 “Australia’s Regional Dialogue on Human Rights,” Parliament of Australia (Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade), accessed July 20, 2020, 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/dialog/Reportinx; 
Bertrand Ramcharan, “Security and Human Rights,” United Nations (United Nations), accessed July 20, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Ramcharan.pdf. 
119 “Rival Myanmar Groups Clash in Indonesia Jail,” www.aljazeera.com, April 5, 2013, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/04/2013455120937667.html. 
2424320  35 
 
3. Fully supporting the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention 
of Genocide.120 
Based on the information presented, ASEAN has a responsibility to intervene under the 
R2P. This would allow them to meet their international obligations as well as better build a 
peaceful region in which equality, justice, and the other values above are present. However, 
ASEAN does not recognize that they are responsible for upholding these values or that this is a 
regional stability issue, despite the threat large influxes of refugees pose to their sovereignty. Some 
individual states, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, have been more vocal in denouncing the 
violence against Rohingya Muslims, but this is not endorsed by ASEAN. As a whole, the 
Association has retained their commitment to the ASEAN Way and its principle of noninterference. 
The influence of face here can only be speculated on because of the organization’s noncommittal 
response and the complications the topics of human rights and refugees bring to the situation. 
ASEAN states do not subscribe to the same definitions of these topics that Western countries do, 
and therefore do not have any significant feelings of obligation to intervene. However, due to the 
integral role face plays in the ASEAN Way and noninterference, it can be at least partly attributed 
to the organization’s continued silence on the atrocities occurring within their region. 
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Conclusion 
 
In both of the above cases, ASEAN took a relatively hands-off approach for various reasons. 
Noninterference was quoted as a major justification in both, and while abiding by this principle 
and the ASEAN Way is understandable and even expected, ignoring issues altogether is not. 
ASEAN states within APSC have recognized that their individual securities are tied together, yet 
they refuse to acknowledge or intervene in domestic security issues that could, and have, spilled 
over borders into neighboring states. As such, there is room for improvement in the organization’s 
approach to regional peace and stability. They walk a fine line between fulfilling their duties as a 
regional organization and saving their face, but even facework allows for indirect discussions and 
the eventual acquisition of consensus. Currently, the extent to which they apply the ASEAN Way 
does not. Furthermore, the organization’s dedication to observing agreements and treaties has been 
inconsistent. This is evidenced by their abiding by the TAC and ZOPFAN in the late 1980s, despite 
Burma having no ties to them, but not holding themselves accountable to follow the R2P. There is 
also the matter of how the noninterference principle is utilized. They did not find fault with 
Indonesia invading East Timor because the noninterference principle was aimed towards external 
actors, yet they cannot intervene in a member state that is committing state-sanctioned, systematic 
genocide because it would be violate the noninterference principle. 
Face is another characteristic of the ASEAN Way that is not observed uniformly. ASEAN 
has historically avoided confrontation and humiliation specifically to preserve its and others’ face. 
Yet, following its admission, Myanmar’s intention was to continue on its own path, regardless of 
ASEAN’s expectations. As it has taken so long to concede to international pressures and openly 
dialogue about the Rakhine region, it is reasonable to assume that Myanmar does value face as 
highly as others do. This is particularly true as meeting others’ expectations and caving to peer 
pressure are clear indicators of practicing facework. While face is rooted within the history of the 
organization, it does not appear to be observed equally by all states. This, and the noninterference 
principle are two characteristics of the ASEAN Way that should be revised, particularly as the 
Association’s security goals have evolved over the decades. Originally, “regional peace and 
stability” and a “region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against any 
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negative influence from outside the region” was the extent of ASEAN’s regional security goals.121 
If these were still the only references to regional peace within the organization, it could be argued 
that they achieved what they set out to. There have not been wars between member states since the 
creation of ASEAN, and no substantial outside threats. However, security goals grew with the 
Association, into those of creating a just and harmonious region, one that “puts people at the centre 
of concern” and overall, a united Southeast Asian community.122 These goals have not been 
attained, and one could argue that the organization has in some aspects, failed in their endeavors 
as even after 50 years, ethnic minorities within the region continue to be violently targeted. 
 In order to fully facilitate ASEAN’s pursual of its goals, all members need to have the same 
understanding of political boundaries and regional responsibilities. Their states are more 
intertwined than ever, and this will only increase. Discrepancies within their understandings of key 
concepts and responsibilities will only serve to stall and weaken the region. If they want the 
international community to see them as a truly effective component of the region’s peace and 
stability, member states should be united in their understandings of regional issues, as well as 
better hold themselves accountable to the treaties they are a part of. Noninterference and the 
ASEAN Way were intended to protect the region from the outside, but they still have a 
responsibility to protect themselves from within. They would only benefit by recognizing that 
security issues can easily spill from state one to the next, and are better dealt with together, rather 
than apart. However, changing their modus operandi would not be easy. A major reason for 
member’s devotion to the ASEAN Way is that it helps maintain the balance of power within the 
organization and the region. Furthermore, it is a way for Southeast Asian states to participate in 
regional dialogues regardless of their political, historical, or economic backgrounds. It ensures all 
states have the same input and are protected from large states exerting their power and pushing 
their agenda on others. Changing the ASEAN Way would be a precarious process, one that would 
require a delicate balance to sustain equality between states, while also saving their face. 
All this is not to say that the Association and its approach have been entirely useless in 
facilitating regional peace. Their successes in creating the SEANWFZ, ZOPFAN, and TAC should 
not be overlooked. Furthermore, consistent engagement through the ASEAN Way has successfully 
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encouraged change within Myanmar. However, it seems that the ASEAN Way has its limits and 
is most useful in times of peace. On multiple occasions, ASEAN has used noninterference almost 
as a way to pick and choose which situations to involve themselves in and have often picked 
noninterference over intervening in situations that led to mass casualties. It has allowed the region 
to continue to exist in varying states of conflict, and there is no reason the ASEAN Way, 
noninterference, and face cannot be respected while also working diligently and effectively 
towards true regional stability. The ASEAN Way is effective in promoting a peaceful and stable 
region, but only to a point. ASEAN leaders have said that the ASEAN Way is dynamic and ever 
evolving, yet for the majority of the organization’s history, it has remained static. Longevity does 
not equate efficacy, and although this approach was ideal in the first turbulent decades of the 
Association’s existence, the ASEAN Way should be evolving with the rest of the region. 
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